As a reminder, the master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass. “These encrypted fields remain secured with 256-bit AES encryption and can only be decrypted with a unique encryption key derived from each user’s master password using our Zero Knowledge architecture. “The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data,” Toubba noted. IP addresses from which customers were accessing the LastPass service.Once the attackers obtained cloud storage access key and dual storage container decryption keys, they copied information from backup that contained customer account info and related metadata, including:
#Lastpass security email code#
“While no customer data was accessed during the August 2022 incident, some source code and technical information were stolen from our development environment and used to target another employee, obtaining credentials and keys which were used to access and decrypt some storage volumes within the cloud-based storage service,” LastPass CEO Karim Toubba explained. LastPass, the company behind the eponymous password manager, has suffered a breach earlier this year, which resulted in attackers accessing its third-party cloud-based storage environment. The LastPass breach resulted in theft of customer vault backups The information couldn’t come at a worst time, as businesses are winding down their activities and employees and users are thick in the midst of last-minute preparations for end-of-year holidays. The August 2022 LastPass breach has resulted in potentially catastrophic consequences for the company and some of its users: attackers have made off with unencrypted customer data and copies of backups of customer vault data.
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